USA v. Kenneth Daniels by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-6-2019 
USA v. Kenneth Daniels 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Kenneth Daniels" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 128. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/128 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 17-3503 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KENNETH DANIELS, 
         
       Appellant 
______________ 
      
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-15-cr-00127-001) 
Honorable Berle M. Schiller, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 23, 2018 
 
BEFORE:  KRAUSE, COWEN, and FUENTES,  
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  February 7, 2019) 
______________ 
 
Case: 17-3503     Document: 003113154934     Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/07/2019
  2 
Emily McKillip 
William M. McSwain 
Timothy M. Stengel 
Robert A. Zauzmer 
Office of United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street 
Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
     Attorneys for Appellee 
 
 
Karl D. Schwartz 
P.O. Box 8846 
Elkins Park, PA 19027 
 
     Attorney for Appellant 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Kenneth Daniels appeals from the criminal sentence 
entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  He argues that a violation of the 
Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic 
Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30), does not qualify as a 
“serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).  We must first decide 
whether § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s definition of a “serious drug 
offense” encompasses attempts (as defined under federal law) to 
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manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or 
distribute a controlled substance.  If it does, we must then 
consider whether the scope of attempt and accomplice liability 
under Pennsylvania law is coextensive with the meaning of 
those terms under federal law.  Based in large part on our recent 
rulings in United States v. Glass, 904 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2018), 
petition for cert. filed (U.S. No. 18-6748) (Nov. 14, 2018), and 
Martinez v. Attorney General, 906 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2018), as 
well as our older yet still precedential opinion in United States 
v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2011), we answer both questions 
in the affirmative.  Accordingly, Daniels’s sentence will be 
affirmed. 
 
I. 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Daniels entered a guilty 
plea to one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a 
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).  He 
had at least three previous convictions under the Pennsylvania 
drug statute, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30), for possession 
with intent to deliver cocaine.  
 
Daniels reserved his right to challenge the government’s 
allegation that he was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e).1  If applied, § 924(e) triggers a fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum.  According to Daniels, his convictions cannot count 
as ACCA predicates because the elements of the state drug 
statute sweep more broadly than the generic definition of a drug 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to United States v, Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (3d 
Cir. 1975), Daniels also preserved his right to appeal the District 
Court’s denial of his suppression motion.  He does not, however, 
raise that issue in this appeal. 
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distribution crime.  He argued that, “[b]y virtue of 
Pennsylvania’s treatment of solicitation and mere offers to sell, 
it is far from clear that a violation of 35 Pa.C.S. § 780-
113(a)(30), is, as a categorical matter, a ‘serious drug offense’ 
within the meaning of ACCA.”  (JA25.)  At sentencing, Daniels 
also argued that, without his armed career criminal designation, 
his Guidelines range would have been 92 to 115 months.  
However, application of this designation would result in a 
Guideline range of 180 months (the statutory minimum) to 210 
months.  The District Court rejected Daniels’s challenge and 
sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment.  
 
II. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We possess appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
Because this appeal raises questions of law, we exercise 
de novo review.  See, e.g., Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 184.     
 
III. 
 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a felon to 
possess a firearm.  The ACCA mandates a minimum sentence of 
fifteen years’ imprisonment if the felon in possession of a 
firearm has three previous convictions for either “a violent 
felony” or “a serious drug offense” (or both): 
 
(e)(1)  In the case of a person who violates section 
922(g) of this title and has three previous 
convictions by any court referred to in section 
922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a 
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serious drug offense, or both, committed on 
occasions different from one another, such person 
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not 
less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, the court shall not suspend 
the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence 
to, such person with respect to the conviction 
under section 922(g). 
 
(2)  As used in this subsection— 
 
(A) the term “serious drug offense” means— 
 
(i)  an offense under the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et 
seq.), the Controlled Substances 
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 
951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 
46, for which a maximum term of 
imprisonment of ten years or more 
is prescribed by law; or 
 
(ii)  an offense under State law, 
involving manufacturing, 
distributing, or possessing with 
intent to manufacture or distribute, 
a controlled substance (as defined 
in section 102 of the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), 
for which a maximum term of 
imprisonment of ten years or more 
is prescribed by law; 
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   (B)  The term “violent felony” means any 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile 
delinquency involving the use or carrying of a 
firearm, knife, or destructive device that would 
be punishable by imprisonment for such term if 
committed by an adult, that— 
 
(i)  has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of 
another; or 
 
(ii)  is burglary, arson, or extortion, 
involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another; and  
 
   (C)  The term “conviction” includes a finding that a 
person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency 
involving a violent felony. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
 
 It is undisputed that we must apply the “categorical” 
approach in order to decide whether Daniels had at least three 
previous convictions for “a serious drug offense.”  Id. “When 
deciding whether a previous conviction counts as a ‘violent 
felony or a serious drug offense’ under the ACCA, a sentencing 
court may look only to the elements of a defendant’s prior 
conviction, not ‘to the particular facts underlying those 
convictions.’”  United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 157 (3d 
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Cir. 2014) (quoting Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 
260-61 (2013)).  As the government states in its appellate brief, 
“the issue is whether the elements of the prior crime encompass 
and are no broader than the elements described in the federal 
definition.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 14 (citing Abbott, 748 F.3d at 
157)).  If the elements of the prior conviction are identical to (or 
narrower than) the elements of the generic ACCA crime, the 
prior conviction can serve as an ACCA predicate.  See, e.g., 
Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.  “But if the statute sweeps more 
broadly than the generic crime, a conviction under that law 
cannot count as an ACCA predicate, even if the defendant 
actually committed the offense in its generic form.”  Id.  The 
categorical approach “requires a realistic probability, not a 
theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to 
conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.”  
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007).  A 
defendant may establish such a probability by showing that the 
state statute was so applied in his or her own case or by pointing 
to other cases in which the state courts applied the statute in a 
non-generic fashion.  See, e.g., id.  Furthermore, a “modified” 
categorical approach may apply to divisible statutes, i.e., a 
statute of conviction that lists alternative elements (as opposed 
to alternative means for committing the same offense).  See, 
e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248-50 (2016).  
Documents like the indictment, jury instructions, a plea 
agreement, or a colloquy may then be employed to determine 
the specific crime of conviction.  See, e.g., id. at 2249.  “The 
court can then compare that crime, as the categorical approach 
commands, with the relevant generic offense.”  Id.      
 
 Section 780-113(a)(30) prohibits (except as authorized by 
the Pennsylvania drug statute) “the manufacture, delivery, or 
possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
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substance by a person not registered under this act, or a 
practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State 
board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with 
intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.”  As we 
recognized in Glass, “Pennsylvania law goes on to define 
‘deliver’ as ‘the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from 
one person to another of a controlled substance.’”  Glass, 904 
F.3d at 322 (quoting 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-102(b)).  “[T]he 
federal counterpart to this statute, the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA), also defines the ‘delivery’ of a controlled substance to 
mean ‘the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a 
controlled substance,’ 21 U.S.C. § 802(8).”2  Glass, 904 F.3d at 
322.  In turn, 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) states that “[t]he term 
‘distribute’ means to deliver (other than by administering or 
dispensing) a controlled substance or a listed chemical.”  
Pennsylvania’s drug law also defines “distribute” to mean “to 
deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled 
substance, other drug, device or cosmetic.”  § 780-102(b).  Both 
federal and Pennsylvania law include statutory provisions 
addressing attempt and accomplice liability.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2 
(“Principals”); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (“Attempt and conspiracy”); 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 306 (“Liability for conduct of another; 
                                                 
2 The full federal and state definitions of “deliver” or 
“delivery” are nearly identical.  According to federal law, “[t]he 
terms ‘deliver’ or delivery’ means the actual, constructive, or 
attempted transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, 
whether or not there exists an agency relationship.”  21 U.S.C. § 
802(8).  Pennsylvania law states that these two terms mean “the 
actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to 
another of a controlled substance, other drug, device or cosmetic 
whether or not there is an agency relationship.”  35 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. § 780-102(b). 
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complicity”), 901 (“Criminal attempt”). 
 
 According to Daniels, Section 780-113(a)(30) sweeps 
more broadly than the generic federal definition of “a serious 
drug crime.”  Daniels vigorously argues that, unlike the 
Pennsylvania drug statute, a “serious drug crime” under the 
ACCA does not include attempts.  He further argues that, 
“[e]ven assuming that attempted drug offenses are properly 
included as serious drug offense predicates,” Pennsylvania’s 
drug act includes conduct that is too inchoate and incipient to 
satisfy federal drug law—specifically “mere offers, mere 
preparation, and mere solicitation (from the buyer).”  
(Appellant’s Brief at 20.)  Given our ruling in Gibbs, we 
conclude that the ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense” 
encompasses attempts, as defined under federal law, to 
manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or 
distribute a controlled substance.  We likewise determine that, 
based on this Court’s recent Glass and Martinez decisions, the 
scope of attempt and accomplice liability under Pennsylvania 
law is coextensive with the meaning of those terms under 
federal law. 
 
A. A “Serious Drug Offense” and Attempts 
 
Glass and Martinez were not ACCA cases.  On the 
contrary, the Glass court considered whether the District Court 
appropriately applied a career offender enhancement under the 
Guidelines.  See Glass, 904 F.3d at 321-24.  The Guidelines 
application note “states that the term ‘controlled substance 
offense’ applies not only to a statute that bars distribution of 
controlled substances, but also to ‘the offenses of aiding and 
abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.’”  
Id. at 322 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1).  Martinez was an 
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immigration case, see Martinez, 906 F.3d at 284-87, and the 
immigration provisions at issue explicitly refer to attempts or 
require a match with the CSA’s ban on drug trafficking,3 see 8 
                                                 
3 In United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2014), 
we considered whether “[Section 780-113(a)(30)] is a ‘divisible’ 
statute under [Descamps],” id. at 156.  In that ACCA case, we 
concluded that Section 780-113(a)(30) is divisible by drug type, 
thereby permitting the application of the modified categorical 
approach.  Id. at 157-60; see also United States v. Henderson, 
841 F.3d 623, 626-63 (3d Cir. 2016) (reaching same conclusion 
as to 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(f)(1)).  Daniels is correct that 
Abbott did not specifically address either the question of 
whether a “serious drug offense” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) 
encompasses attempt crimes or the scope of the Pennsylvania 
drug statute as to attempt offenses or accomplice liability.  
However, we did state that “Abbott’s previous conviction under 
35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30) for possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine is a ‘serious drug offense’ and properly served 
as a predicate offense for the imposition of the fifteen-year 
minimum sentence under the ACCA.”  Abbott, 748 F.3d at 160. 
 According to our recent opinion in Glass, “[w]e have already 
held that conviction under § 780-113(a)(30) for cocaine-based 
offenses is not overbroad in the context of the ACCA’s 
definition of ‘serious drug offense.’”  Glass, 904 F.3d at 323 
(citing Abbott, 748 F.3d at 160).   
 
In this case, it is undisputed that Daniels’s prior 
convictions involved cocaine.  The government also does not 
take issue with Daniels’s characterization of Section 780-
113(a)(30) as indivisible with respect to the manner of 
committing the offense (i.e., whether by manufacture, delivery, 
or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, attempted 
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U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B) (stating that “aggravated felony” 
means “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as 
defined in section 924(c) of title 18)”), 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any 
alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a 
violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of 
title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for 
one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”). 
 
But Gibbs did consider the meaning of a “serious drug 
offense” under the ACCA.  The government appealed from the 
district court’s ruling that a prior conviction under Delaware law 
for wearing body armor while committing a felony is not a 
predicate offense under the ACCA.  Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 182.  
The defendant had been charged in state court under this body 
armor statute and for possession with intent to deliver.  Id. at 
183.  He pled guilty to the first count but not the second one.  Id. 
 On appeal, we agreed with the government and held “that the 
body armor conviction is an ACCA predicate offense because it 
involved the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  Id. 
at 182.  In short, “[i]t is ‘a serious drug offense.’”  Id. (quoting § 
924(e)(1)).   
 
In reaching our decision, we began with the text of the 
ACCA: 
 
The issue is whether the body armor conviction 
“involv[ed] manufacturing, distributing, or 
                                                                                                             
manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture 
or deliver, or acting as an accomplice).         
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possessing, with intent to manufacture or 
distribute, a controlled substance.” 
 
 Congress’s use of the term “involving” 
expands the meaning of a serious drug offense 
beyond the simple offenses of manufacturing, 
distributing, and possessing a controlled 
substance.  See, e.g., United States v. James, 834 
F.2d 92, 93 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that 
“violations ‘involving’ the distribution, 
manufacture, or importation of controlled 
substances must be read as including more than 
merely crimes of distribution, manufacturing, and 
importation themselves”).  The plain meaning of 
“involve” is “to relate closely” or to “connect 
closely.”  United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 
39, 43 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 1191 (1993) and 
The American Heritage Dictionary 921 (4th ed. 
2000), respectively).  The definition of a serious 
drug offense should be construed to extend “§ 
924(e) beyond the precise offenses of distributing, 
manufacturing, or possessing, and as 
encompassing as well offenses that are related to 
or connected with such conduct.”  United States 
v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003).  In 
adopting this position, we conform with all courts 
of appeals that have addressed the scope of the 
definition of a serious drug offense.  See United 
States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 
2008); McKenney, 450 F.3d at 42; United States 
v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 
King, 325 F.3d at 113; United States v. Brandon, 
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247 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 2001).          
 
Id. at 184-85. 
 
 The Gibbs Court then considered and rejected the 
defendant’s theory that the definition of state serious drug 
offenses set forth in Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) should be limited 
to the types of crimes identified by the three federal statutes 
(including the CSA) referenced in Section 924(e)(2)(A)(i).  Id. 
at 185.  “While both subsections relate to the same subject, there 
is no reason to think that subsection (i) should limit our 
construction of subsection (ii).  If Congress wished to do this, it 
could have done so [as it did in the “three strikes” law, 18 
U.S.C. § 3559(c)].”  Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 185.  “Instead, Congress 
used broad terminology—‘involving’—to define the category of 
serious drug offenses without limiting its scope to federal 
statutes.”  Id.  “Congress adopted a broad interpretation of ‘a 
serious drug offense’ because it intended to define ‘an entire 
class of state offenses “involving” certain activities, namely, 
“manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to 
manufacture or distribute” a controlled substance.’  Alexander, 
331 F.3d at 131 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)).”  Gibbs, 
656 F.3d at 185 (“Each state has different serious drug crimes 
and different definitions for similar crimes.  Thus, Congress 
relied upon general language referencing the entire class of 
serious state drug offenses.”). 
 
 Although the statutory language broadly carves out a 
class of serious state drug crimes, Gibbs observed that there are 
limits to how widely we could construe this class.  Id.  “As the 
First Circuit noted, ‘(n)ot all offenses bearing any sort of 
relationship with drug manufacturing, distribution, or possession 
with intent to manufacture or distribute will qualify as predicate 
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offenses under ACCA.  The relationship must not be too remote 
or tangential.’”  Id. (quoting McKenney, 450 F.3d at 45). 
 
 “We must therefore determine whether Gibbs’ body 
armor conviction is related to or connected with manufacturing, 
distributing, or possessing, with intent to manufacture or 
distribute, a controlled substance or if it is too remote or 
tangential.”  Id. at 185-86.  Initially, this Court went beyond the 
terms of the statute of conviction (which simply proscribes the 
wearing of body armor during the commission of a felony) to 
consider the indictment (alleging in Count I that Gibbs 
knowingly wore body armor during the commission of felony 
possession with intent to deliver cocaine as set forth in Count II, 
which was incorporated by reference) pursuant to the modified 
categorical approach.  Id. at 186-88.  We then examined 
“whether manufacturing, distributing, or possessing, with intent 
to manufacture or [distribute], a controlled substance, is ‘an 
inherent part or result of the generic crime’ of wearing body 
armor while committing a felony, where that felony is 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine.”  Id. at 188 (quoting 
Brandon, 247 F.3d at 188).  We found that the underlying felony 
is an inherent part of the offense because “it must be proven in 
order to be guilty of the body armor offense.”  Id.  While the 
defendant need not be convicted of a drug offense, the 
prosecution must still prove the elements of the drug offense in 
order to establish that the defendant is guilty of some underlying 
felony.  Id.  “In pleading guilty to the body armor offense, Gibbs 
pled guilty to the elements of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine.”  Id.  Wearing body armor also serves to promote and 
advance the underlying drug crime (in other words, it makes it 
more likely that a felony will occur).4  Id.   
                                                 
4 We also rejected Gibbs’s argument that “this 
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 We have no trouble concluding that a conviction under 
state law for attempted manufacturing, distributing, or 
possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled 
substance that also meets the requirements for an attempted drug 
crime under federal law would satisfy the approach we adopted 
in Gibbs.    
  
Daniels asserts that Gibbs does not extend the definition 
of a “serious drug offense” beyond the generic categories of 
manufacturing, distributing, and possession with intent.  Citing 
our ruling in United States v. Tucker, 703 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 
2012), he contends that “the Gibbs Court held only that a 
possession-with-intent offense does not cease to be a serious 
drug offense on the ground that it was the factual predicate for 
the felony establishing the crime of possession of body armor in 
course of a felony.”  (Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5 (citing Gibbs, 
656 F.3d at 188).)  However, the Tucker Court merely rejected 
the government’s argument that the state court charge of 
conspiracy to sell drugs (which resulted in a conviction) 
incorporated a separate possession with intent to deliver 
(“PWID”) cocaine charge (which resulted in an acquittal) as the 
overt act.  Tucker, 703 F.3d at 212-13.  We distinguished Gibbs 
because, unlike the body armor count (which expressly 
incorporated the drug charge), “neither the conspiracy Bill nor 
the conspiracy incorporated the separate PWID charge.”  Id. at 
213.  “The jury could legally have found the overt act to be 
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver.  Nothing 
‘actually required’ the jury to treat the separate PWID cocaine 
charge as the overt act.”  Id.  
                                                                                                             
interpretation of ‘a serious drug offense’ raises a constitutional 
problem of fair notice.”  Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 188-89.    
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Simply put, if a body-armor conviction is sufficiently 
“related to or connected with” manufacturing, distributing, or 
possessing with the intent to manufacture or distribute a 
controlled substance to pass muster under Gibbs, the federal 
inchoate versions of these enumerated offenses clearly satisfy 
the test.  As the government aptly explains, “[t]o say that an 
attempt to manufacture methamphetamine does not involve 
manufacturing methamphetamine, or that an attempt to 
distribute cocaine does not involve the distribution of cocaine, is 
untenable.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 21.)  The criminal attempt to 
commit an offense “involves” the completed offense.   
 
In McKenney, the First Circuit explained why “[t]he 
plain meaning of ‘involve’ is ‘to relate closely’ or to ‘connect 
closely.’”  Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 184 (quoting McKenney, 450 F.3d 
at 43).  Rejecting the defendant’s narrow definition of “involve” 
as meaning “has as an element,” to “include,” or to “contain as a 
part,” the First Circuit observed that his argument would require 
“an awkward and unusual construction of the text to mean that a 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute does not ‘involve’ 
possession with intent to distribute.”  McKenney, 450 F.3d at 43 
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).  “Conspiracies 
“involve’ their objects, as that term is used in common 
parlance.”  Id.  The First Circuit explained:  “[w]e need not 
decide today where the line is:  we hold only that the 
relationship between the inchoate offense of conspiracy and its 
object—its entire purpose—is plainly close enough that a 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute is, under the 
ACCA, an offense ‘involving . . . possessing with intent to . . . 
distribute.’”  Id. at 45 (citing United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1, 
3-4 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by United 
States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2008) (en banc); United 
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States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1998)); see also id. 
at 44 (“By contrast, in McKenney’s case, there is no question 
that the possession at the heart of the conspiracy was possession 
with intent to distribute.  That is the charge to which McKenney 
pled.”).  Likewise, the relationship between the inchoate offense 
of attempt and the completed offense the defendant attempted to 
commit is plainly close enough that an attempt to manufacture, 
distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute a 
controlled substance is, under the ACCA, an offense involving 
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to 
manufacture or distribute a controlled substance. 
 
In Gibbs, we indicated that “all courts of appeals that 
have addressed the scope of the definition of a serious drug 
offense” have adopted an expansive understanding of this 
concept.  Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 185 (citing Vickers, 540 F.3d at 
365; McKenney, 450 F.3d at 42; Alexander, 331 F.3d at 131; 
King, 325 F.3d at 113; Brandon, 247 F.3d at 191).  Since our 
2011 ruling, the circuit courts have continued to apply an 
expansive reading of § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (and Daniels has not 
cited any contrary case law).  See United States v. Herrold, 813 
F.3d 595, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. granted & vacated on 
other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 310 (2016); United States v. 
Whindleton, 797 F.3d 105, 108-11 (1st Cir. 2015); United States 
v. Bynum, 669 F.3d 880, 884-88 (8th Cir. 2012).  It is also 
uncontested that every court of appeals to have considered the 
specific question of whether a “serious drug offense” under § 
924(e)(2)(A)(ii) includes attempts has answered this question in 
the affirmative.5  See United States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 
                                                 
5 The government cites to a number of non-precedential 
dispositions that have reached the same conclusion regarding the 
inclusion of attempt crimes.  See United States v. White, 288 F. 
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339 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 
1008-09 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d 
703, 705-08 (5th Cir. 2005); Alexander, 331 F.3d at 130-31; 
King, 325 F.3d at 112-15. 
 
 Defending the narrower definition expressly considered 
and rejected by the First Circuit in McKenney, Daniels invokes 
the canon of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius—when a 
statute specifically enumerates some categories, it impliedly 
excludes others.”  Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 296 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).  
According to Daniels, “the offenses listed under Section 
924(e)(2)(A)(ii) involve a comprehensive set of ways of 
committing narcotics offenses (except for attempts), leading to 
the conclusion that the exclusion was ‘not inadvertence.’”  
(Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11 (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody 
Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)).)  “Indeed, the other ACCA 
predicate ‘violent felony,’ does provide an attempt alternative.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (including ‘attempted use’ of 
physical force as violent felony).”  (Appellant’s Brief at 17.)  
The CSA criminalizes attempted federal drug offenses, see 21 
U.S.C. §§ 802(8), 846, and, in turn, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i) 
provides that a “serious drug offense” includes “an offense 
under the Controlled Substances Act.”  Daniels therefore argues 
that Congress, if it had really “intended to include inchoate 
conduct as a drug predicate” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), 
purportedly could have done what it did with respect to the other 
ACCA predicate offenses.  (Appellant’s Brief at 18.)  The 
                                                                                                             
App’x 89, 90 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Holt, 
246 F. App’x 602, 609-10 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Thomas, 13 F. App’x 233, 240-43 (6th Cir. 2001).        
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Guidelines’ application note addressed in Glass (as well as an 
immigration provision considered in Martinez) also explicitly 
refers to attempts.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); U.S.S.G. § 
4B1.2 cmt. n.1. 
 
Nevertheless, the expressio unius canon has its limits, 
e.g., it “does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it 
has force only when the items expressed are members of an 
‘associated group or series,’ justifying the inference that items 
not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not 
inadvertence.”  Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 168 (citing United States 
v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).  There was no reason for 
Congress to add specific language regarding attempt crimes 
because it had already included the term “involving”—a term 
that both this Court and every other circuit court to have 
addressed the issue has concluded must be interpreted broadly 
(and that, under this existing case law, clearly encompasses 
attempts).  Neither § 924(e)(2)(A)(i) nor § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) 
includes such expansive language.  See, e.g., Alexander, 331 
F.3d at 131 (“As the government correctly observes, the 
Congress defined the terms ‘violent felony’ and ‘serious drug 
offense’ in decidedly different manners.  Unlike the definition of 
‘violent felony,’ the definition of ‘serious drug offense’ does not 
speak in specifics; instead, it defines the term to include an 
entire class of state offenses ‘involving’ certain activities, 
namely ‘manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to 
manufacture or distribute’ a controlled substance.” (quoting § 
924(e)(2)(A)(ii))).  The career offender Guideline similarly 
defines a “controlled substance offense” as, inter alia, an offense 
that “prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or 
dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) 
or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit 
substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, 
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or dispense.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added).     
 
In his reply brief, Daniels recognizes that “the character 
of federal drug offenses can inform the question of whether a 
prior drug offense sweeps more broadly than the elements of the 
generic offense.”  (Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4 (citing United 
States v. Mitchell, 218 F. Supp. 3d 360, 368 (M.D. Pa. 2016)).)  
A “serious drug offense” includes an offense under state law 
involving “distributing” or “possessing with intent to . . . 
distribute” a controlled substance.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). 
 The federal CSA defines this term “distribute” to mean “to 
deliver (other than by administering or dispensing) a controlled 
substance or a listed chemical.”  21 U.S.C. § 802(11).  The 
federal drug statute then defines the “terms ‘deliver’ or 
‘delivery’ as including an “attempted transfer of a controlled 
substance.” Id. § 802(8).  Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) expressly 
references the CSA in the parenthetical “(as defined in section 
102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).”  This 
Court stated in Rojas v. Attorney General, 728 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 
2013) (en banc), that “the parenthetical ‘(as defined in section 
802 of Title 21)’ [used in §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i)] is a restrictive modifier that affects only its 
immediate antecedent, a ‘controlled substance,’” id. at 209.  
However, the en banc Court was simply explaining that “the 
controlled substance [must be] as such by federal law.”  Id.   
 
Moreover, this analysis does not translate to the ACCA 
context because § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) includes the terms 
“manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to 
manufacture or distribute” immediately before the phrase “a 
controlled substance” and the parenthetical itself.  By referring 
to the ways of committing a controlled substance offense—
which are defined in “section 802 of the Controlled Substance 
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Act”—the ACCA provision makes it clear that the parenthetical 
modifies more than just “a controlled substance.”  “Congress 
has [also] demonstrated that it does not view attempted drug 
trafficking offenses as any less serious than completed acts” 
because it subjected any person who attempts or conspires to 
commit a drug offense to the same penalties applicable to the 
completed offenses.  Coleman, 700 F.3d at 339 (quoting 21 
U.S.C. § 846).   
        
 The D.C. Circuit relied on another well-established canon 
of statutory construction to reject the defendant’s expressio 
unius argument: 
 
Moreover, as the district court recognized, the use 
of “attempted” in section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) does 
not—by itself—indicate that the Congress 
intended to exclude attempt convictions from the 
definition of “serious drug offense[s]” in section 
924(e)(2)(A)(ii).  Indeed, well-established 
principles of statutory construction counsel 
otherwise; if we were to adopt Alexander’s 
reading of section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), the term 
“involving” would be rendered meaningless—
“distribution alone would qualify as a crime 
‘involving’ distribution” and possession with 
intent to distribute alone would qualify as a crime 
“involving” possession with intent to distribute.  
United States v. Contreras, 895 F.2d 1241, 1244 
(9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that 
possession with intent to distribute is not crime 
“involving” distribution). . . . .   
 
 Alexander, 331 F.3d at 131.  
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Daniels challenges this line of reasoning, claiming that 
the “term ‘involving’ is necessary to avoid the problem of 
nomenclature that necessarily arises when a federal statute 
incorporates fifty state statutes.”  (Appellant’s Reply Brief at 
13.)  Section 780-113(a)(3) of the Pennsylvania drug statute 
prohibits the unauthorized “delivery” of a controlled substance, 
but, unlike § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), it does not use the term 
“distributing.”  Daniels appears to suggest that, if the ACCA 
provision were to include only crimes that “prohibit” (as 
opposed to “involve”) distribution, a violation of the 
Pennsylvania drug statute would not constitute a “serious drug 
offense.”  (See id. (“In fact, a person can commit drug offenses 
in Pennsylvania through ‘distribution’ just not under 35 Pa. Stat. 
§ 780-113(a)(30).  The terms have different definitions (see § 
780-102(b)), notwithstanding that ‘delivery’ is the equivalent of 
the generic “distribution” in Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).”).) 
 
Daniels offers no case law or any other support for his 
rather complicated reading.  Both Pennsylvania and federal drug 
laws provide essentially identical definitions of distribution and 
delivery, defining “delivery” or “deliver” as the actual, 
constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance and 
“distribute” as “to deliver” (other than by administering or 
dispensing the substance).  Compare 21 U.S.C. § 802(8), (11) 
with 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-102(b).  Although this issue was 
not specifically addressed in our opinion, we still concluded in 
Glass that Section 780-113(a)(30) constitutes a “controlled 
substance offense” under the career offender Guidelines.  The 
Guidelines nevertheless define a “controlled substance offense” 
as an offense that, inter alia, “prohibits” the distribution of a 
controlled substance or the possession of controlled substance 
with intent to distribute (thereby omitting any “involving” 
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language).  Glass, 904 F.3d at 321-24.  
 
 Given our precedential opinion in Gibbs, it is not too 
surprising that Daniels asks us to reconsider this ruling in light 
of subsequent Supreme Court case law.  See, e.g., 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
9.1 (“it is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in 
a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels.  Thus, 
no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential 
opinion of a previous panel.  Court en banc consideration is 
required to do so.”).  It is also not unexpected that he challenges 
the various rulings from other circuits adopting an expansive 
interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) and holding that this ACCA 
provision encompasses attempts.  Daniels contends that the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. 
Ct. 2243 (2016), calls into question our interpretation of the 
imprecise term “involving” as well as our application of the 
modified categorical approach.  According to Daniels, the focus 
upon state statutory elements under the categorical approach 
“cuts against the argument that the presence of the term 
‘involving’ in Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) should encourage a more 
elastic approach to inclusion of drug offenses that do not 
approximate those listed in Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).”  
(Appellant’s Reply Brief at 8.)  Additionally, Daniels argues 
“[i]t would violate due process to impose such liability in the 
absence of any such reference [to attempts].  See United States 
v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1977) (‘[T]he canon of strict 
construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair 
warning by resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply 
it only to conduct clearly covered’) (citations omitted).”  
(Appellant’s October 1, 2018 Letter at 2.)  Daniels finally 
attempts to compare § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) with the ACCA’s 
“residual” clause (i.e., “violent felony” means any crime that, 
inter alia, “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
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potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).  This clause was invalidated as 
unconstitutionally vague by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).     
   
 Given the narrow scope of our holding in this case, we 
reject Daniels’s assertion that Gibbs and the existing case law 
interpreting § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) undermine the categorical 
approach.  We hold that the definition of a “serious drug 
offense” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) encompasses attempts, as 
defined by federal law, to manufacture, distribute, or possess 
with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance.  
Our holding thereby implicates a categorical comparison 
between the elements of an inchoate drug crime under the 
applicable state law with the elements of such an inchoate 
offense under federal drug law (an analysis we conduct in the 
next section of this opinion).  We accordingly need not—and do 
not—decide if “Section 924(e) does not require the state statute 
under which a defendant was convicted to be co-extensive with 
a federal drug statute.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 8.)  Given our 
analysis of Pennsylvania and federal law governing attempts and 
accomplice liability, we leave for another day the government’s 
alternative arguments that, “even if the Pennsylvania statute 
extended to offers to sell:  any statute that bars an ‘offer to sell 
drugs’ is one ‘involving’ the distribution of drugs under ACCA, 
as many courts have held” (id. at 26 (citations omitted)), and 
that, even if Pennsylvania’s solicitation law sweeps more 
broadly than its federal counterpart, “[s]uch criminal conduct is 
not so remote or tangential to its aim, that is, the actual or 
constructive transfer of a controlled substance, to justify 
disqualification as a ‘serious drug offense’ under ACCA” (id. at 
29).  See Glass, 904 F.3d at 322 (observing that we have yet to 
determine whether or in what circumstances state statutes 
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criminalizing offers to sell constitute “controlled substance 
offenses,” noting that other circuits have held state statutes 
expressly criminalizing mere offers do not qualify, and, 
assuming that such statute sweeps beyond career offender 
Guideline, concluding that Section 780-113(a)(30) does not do 
so).     
  
We also do not agree with the other assertions raised by 
Daniels.  Daniels (yet again) cites to no case law rejecting Gibbs 
or the numerous “serious drug offense” rulings from other 
circuits based on Mathis, the rule of lenity, or vagueness 
concerns.  On the contrary, he draws more attention to this lack 
of case law by observing that the Supreme Court in James 
(which was overruled by Johnson) “pointed out, as the 
Government has here, that ‘every Court of Appeals that ha[d] 
construed the’ [attempted burglary] issue in James, ‘ha[d] held 
the offense qualifies as [an ACCA predicate.]’”  (Appellant’s 
Reply Brief at 14 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 
204 (2007)).)   Furthermore, the limits of the modified 
categorical approach recently addressed by the Supreme Court 
in Mathis have no bearing on the current appeal.  Daniels was 
not convicted under a statute criminalizing “wear[ing] body 
armor during the commission of a felony,’” Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 
184 (quoting 11 Del. C. § 1449), or stating that if two or more 
persons conspire “‘[t]o commit any crime[,] . . . they are guilty 
of a conspiracy,’”  United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1052 
(10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 421(A)), 
abrogated by Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251 & n.1.  Instead, he was 
convicted of “violations of the Pennsylvania drug act, which 
prohibits ‘the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to 
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.’”  (Appellant’s 
Brief at 10 (quoting § 780-113(a)(30)).)  It is Daniels who then 
goes beyond the bare terms of Section 780-113(a)(30) to point 
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out that this specific provision includes attempts as well as 
completed drug crimes.  The Johnson Court also focused on the 
“grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a 
crime,” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557, as well as “how much risk 
it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony,” id. at at 2558. 
 Unlike the residual clause, § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) does not include 
any reference to a potential risk of injury.6  
 
B. Attempts and Accomplice Liability under Federal 
and Pennsylvania Law 
 
 Because § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s definition of “a serious drug 
offense” encompasses attempts (as defined under federal law) to 
manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or 
distribute a controlled substance, we must decide whether 
Pennsylvania criminalizes conduct under the attempt or 
accomplice framework that are not crimes under federal law.  
According to Daniels, Pennsylvania law sweeps more broadly 
than federal law because it criminalizes offers to sell, mere 
preparation, and solicitation by the buyer.  We do not agree.  
Given our recent precedential opinions in Glass and Martinez, 
we conclude that Pennsylvania’s approach to attempts as well as 
the state’s doctrine of accomplice liability are coextensive with 
its federal counterparts.  
 
The federal and Pennsylvania approaches to attempt 
liability in the drug offense context are essentially identical.  As 
we have already explained, Pennsylvania law defines “deliver” 
or “delivery” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer 
                                                 
6 We also note that Gibbs expressly considered and 
rejected a vagueness challenge to our interpretation of a “serious 
drug offense.”  Gibbs, 656 F.3d at 188-89.   
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from one person to another of a controlled substance.”  35 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 780-102(b).  The federal CSA “also defines the 
‘delivery’ of a controlled substance to mean ‘the actual, 
constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance.’”  
Glass, 904 F.3d at 322 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(8)).  Section 
846 of the CSA provides that “[a]ny person who attempts . . . to 
commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to 
the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the 
commission of which was the object of the attempt.”  Most 
federal courts (including this Circuit) have followed the Model 
Penal Code’s framework for attempt liability.  See, e.g., 
Martinez, 906 F.3d at 284.  “Consistent with the Model Penal 
Code, federal ‘attempt’ requires intent and a substantial step 
towards to the commission of the crime.  See United States v. 
Cruz-Jiminez, 977 F.2d 95, 101-03 (3d Cir. 1992); Model Penal 
Code § 5.01.”  Glass, 904 F.3d at 323 n.3; see also, e.g., 
Martinez, 906 F.3d at 284 (“So we too require a ‘substantial step 
toward commission of the crime’ that ‘strongly corroborat[es] 
the firmness of a defendant’s criminal purpose.’  United States 
v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 985 (3d Cir. 1993).”).  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 901(a) states that “[a] person commits an attempt when, 
with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which 
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that 
crime.”  While it was undisputed in Glass that “‘attempt’ under 
Pennsylvania law has the same meaning as ‘attempt’ in the CSA 
and the Guidelines,” Glass, 904 F.3d at 322, Martinez concluded 
that both New Jersey and federal attempt law follow the same 
Model Penal Code approach, Martinez, 906 F.3d at 284-85 (“It 
defines attempt as a purposeful ‘act or omission constituting 
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in 
[the] commission of the crime.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-1(a)(3).  
And a ‘substantial step’ must be ‘strongly corroborative’ of the 
actor’s criminal purpose.’  Id. § 2C:5-1(b).”).  The Pennsylvania 
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attempt provision is also based on the Model Penal Code.  See, 
e.g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 901 Jt. State Gov’t Comm’n cmt. 
(“This section is derived from Section 5.01 of the Model Penal 
Code.”); Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 1008 n.3 
(Pa. 1983) (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating 
that Pennsylvania attempt statute and Model Penal Code 
“similarly define” criminal attempt).  Accordingly, “[t]here is no 
daylight between the federal and [Pennsylvania] formulations 
[of attempt].”  Martinez, 906 F.3d at 285. 
   
Similarly, both states, as well as the federal government 
and the Model Penal Code, treat some solicitations as attempts.  
Under New Jersey law, solicitation constitutes an attempt only if 
it is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.  Id.  
As we explained in Martinez: 
 
New Jersey’s approach, like that of federal law, 
follows the Model Penal Code.  Both federal law 
and the Model Penal Code recognize that 
“solicitation accompanied by the requisite intent 
may constitute an attempt.”  United States v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1121 (5th Cir. 
1984); see, e.g., United States v. Cornelio-Pena, 
435 F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2006); Model 
Penal Code § 5.01(2)(g).  Our Court agrees.  
Glass, [904 F.3d at 323 n.3].  So New Jersey law 
tracks federal law:  Solicitation may amount to an 
attempt when it strongly corroborates the actor’s 
criminal purpose.  Not all solicitations make the 
cut, but some do. 
 
Id. at 285-86; see also Glass, 904 F.3d at 323 n.3 (“In pointing 
out this flaw in the logic of Glass’s argument, we are not 
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suggesting that ‘attempted transfer’ in 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) 
includes offers or solicitations other than those that meet the 
requirements for ‘attempt’ under the CSA.  Consistent with the 
Model Penal Code, federal ‘attempt’ requires intent and a 
substantial step towards the commission of the crime.” (citing 
Cruz-Jimenez, 977 F.2d at 101-03; Model Penal Code § 501)).  
In reaching this conclusion, we expressly disagreed with a Ninth 
Circuit solicitation case cited by Daniels.  In Sandoval v. 
Sessions, 866 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2017), the Ninth Circuit 
addressed an Oregon delivery statute that resembles New 
Jersey’s trafficking law (i.e., they both require a substantial step 
that is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose and 
allow solicitation to amount to attempt).  Martinez, 906 F.3d at 
286 (citing Sandoval, 866 F.3d at 991).  “Yet the Ninth Circuit 
held that the Oregon law was broader than federal law.  
‘Although [it may be] strongly corroborative of intent to commit 
a crime,’ the court reasoned, ‘offering to deliver a controlled 
substance does not cross the line between preparation and 
attempt for the purposes of the [federal] Controlled Substances 
Act.’”  Id. (quoting Sandoval, 866 F.3d at 990).  However, we 
emphasized the shared origins of federal and state attempt law: 
 
As explained above, federal attempt law is 
explicitly based on the Model Penal Code.  Both 
provide that any substantial step that strongly 
corroborates the actor’s criminal purpose amounts 
to an attempt.  Model Penal Code § 5.01(2).  The 
Model Penal Code specifies that solicitation 
“shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law” 
if it is strongly corroborative, as we and other 
circuits recognize.  Id. § 5.01(2)(g); see, e.g., 
Glass, [904 F.3d at 323 n.3]; Am. Airlines, 743 
F.2d at 1121. 
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 We see no reason to reject the Model Penal 
Code.  Our precedent embraces it.  Solicitation, 
like any number of other acts, can amount to a 
federal attempt.  So New Jersey attempt law is no 
broader than federal law.  Martinez’s conviction 
is thus an aggravated felony, making him 
removable. 
 
Id. at 286-87.      
 
Likewise, Pennsylvania and federal law base their 
respective approaches to accomplice liability on the Model 
Penal Code.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 306(c)(1) states that a 
person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of 
the offense “if (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of the offense, he:  (i) solicits such other person to 
commit it or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other 
person in planning or committing it.”  This definition is almost 
identical to the Model Penal Code’s definition of accomplice 
liability, e.g. “a person is an accomplice if: (a) with the purpose 
of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, he (i) 
solicits such other person to commit it, or (ii) aids or agrees or 
attempts to aid such person in planning or committing it.”  
Model Penal Code § 2.06(3).  In turn, “[w]hoever commits an 
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as 
a principal.”  Id. at § 2(a).  Both Pennsylvania law and the 
Model Penal Code essentially require what we have stated is 
required to prove aiding and abetting under federal law, i.e., 
proof that the defendant had the specific intent to facilitate the 
crime and acted to facilitate it.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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“We have yet to determine whether or in what 
circumstances state statutes that criminalize offers to sell 
constitute ‘controlled substance offenses’ under the Guidelines.  
Increasingly, however, our sister Circuits have held state statutes 
expressly criminalizing a mere ‘offer’ do not.”  Glass, 904 F.3d 
at 322 (citing United States v, Madkins, 866 F.3d 1136, 1147 
(10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 572 
(5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959, 965-66 
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Redden, 875 F.3d 374, 375 (7th 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1343 (2018); United States v. 
Bryant, 571 F.3d 147, 158 (1st Cir. 2009)).  Glass refrained 
from answering this question because Section 780-113(a)(30) 
does not criminalize mere offers to sell.  Id.  As we have already 
observed in our discussion of § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) and attempts, 
we likewise need not—and do not—decide at this time whether 
the government is correct that “any statute that bars an ‘offer to 
sell drugs is one ‘involving’ the distribution under ACCA” 
(Appellee’s Brief at 26 (citations omitted)) because the 
Pennsylvania drug statute does not “cross[] that line,” id.   
 
In his supplemental submission addressing Glass, Daniels 
“recognizes that Circuit precedent now holds that Pennsylvania 
does not impose liability for an offer to sell.”  (Appellant’s 
October 1, 2018 Letter at 3.)  We reasoned that Section 780-
113(a)(10) does not mention offers to sell (even though at least 
one other provision contained in Section 780-113 does expressly 
prohibit offers, see 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(1)).  Glass, 
904 F.3d at 322-23.  Glass argued that a mere offer to sell drugs 
is implied by Pennsylvania’s definition of “deliver,” which, like 
both the CSA and the Guidelines, includes attempted transfers.  
Id. at 322.  We rejected that argument, stating that, “[a]s Glass 
does not dispute that ‘attempt’ under Pennsylvania has the same 
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meaning as ‘attempt’ in the CSA and the Guidelines, his 
argument, if accepted, would prove self-defeating, for if § 780-
102(b) sweeps in mere offers to sell, then by his logic, so does 
21 U.S.C. § 802(8) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, making the state 
offense broad, but no broader than the federal one.”  Id. at 322-
23 (footnote omitted).  Furthermore, “the parties have failed to 
uncover any authority, such as state judicial decisions or pattern 
jury instructions, suggesting that Pennsylvania would prosecute 
a mere offer to sell under § 780-113(a)(30).”  Id. at 323 (citing 
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193).  The Glass Court then 
distinguished Pennsylvania’s statutory definition of “deliver” 
from the more expansive Texas definition at issue in Hinkle and 
Conley (which expressly states that “deliver” includes offering 
to sell) and compared it with the narrower Illinois understanding 
of “deliver” addressed in Redden.  Id.  Finally, we noted that our 
conclusion “is consistent with our prior holdings regarding § 
730-113(a)(30) outside of the U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 context,” 
including our holding in Abbott that a conviction for cocaine-
based offenses “is not overbroad in the context of the ACCA’s 
definition of ‘serious drug offense.’”  Id. (citing Abbott, 748 
F.3d at 160); see also, e.g., Martinez, 906 F.3d at 286 
(distinguishing Texas law encompassing mere offer to sell 
without evidence of possession or transfer as “far cry” from 
conviction under New Jersey possession with intent statute).   
 
In addition to seeking to preserve the “offer to sell” issue 
for later review, Daniels purportedly cites to an authority 
suggesting that Pennsylvania does in fact prosecute offers to 
sell.  See, e.g., Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193 (“[T]o find that 
a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition . . . 
requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that 
the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the 
generic definition of a crime.”).  We do not agree. 
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In Commonwealth v. Donahue, 630 A.2d 1238 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1993), the defendant argued that the Berks County 
trial court lacked jurisdiction over the drug possession crimes 
because the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that he 
actually or constructively possessed marijuana in Berks County 
(where his supplier, Bieber, lived) as opposed to Bucks County 
(where the defendant resided and received the shipment of 
marijuana), id. at 1242-43.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
however, determined that Donahue was properly convicted as an 
accessory to Bieber’s possession in Berks County.  Id. at 1244.  
In the process, it looked to Pennsylvania’s crime of solicitation, 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 902, as well as the state statutory 
provision governing accomplice liability, see § 306.  Donahue, 
630 A.2d at 1243-44.  
 
 The Donahue court accordingly applied Pennsylvania’s 
law of accomplice liability—which is essentially identical to the 
federal approach to liability for aiding and abetting.  The facts 
indicated that Bieber and Donahue were business associates 
involved in the distribution of marijuana.  Id. at 1244.  Donahue 
told Bieber by telephone that, if Bieber received a shipment, he 
would be interested in acquiring it.  Id.  The supplier then 
received a shipment at his home in Berks County and 
transported it to the defendant’s home in Bucks County.  Id.  
“Bieber also testified that he had conducted business with 
appellant five to ten times in the past.”  Id.  Based on their prior 
relationship, the Pennsylvania Superior Court believed it could 
be reasonably inferred that the statement to Bieber implied that 
Donahue “both encouraged and requested Bieber to obtain 
marijuana to sell to him.”  Id.  Accordingly, the evidence 
established that he solicited Bieber to purchase and possess the 
marijuana with the intent to deliver.  Id.  The evidence also 
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established that he intended to promote or facilitate the 
commission of the offense under the accomplice liability 
provision:  “Taken one step further, it is also reasonably clear 
that appellant intended to promote Bieber to commit the offense 
so that he, in turn could obtain marijuana to sell.”  Id.  In fact, 
Donahue’s conviction was vacated on other grounds, and the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court specifically directed the trial judge 
to “instruct the jury that appellant may only be found guilty for 
those actions which occurred in Berks County if it finds that he 
was an accomplice to Bieber.”  Id. at 1244 n.8. 
 
We also reject Daniels’s assertion that Commonwealth v. 
Parker, 957 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008), indicated that 
Pennsylvania effectively criminalizes mere preparation.  In that 
case, a police officer conducting a traffic stop found that Parker 
had a substance that was made to look like cocaine but was 
actually candle wax.  Id. at 317-18.  The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court affirmed Parker’s conviction for attempted delivery of a 
counterfeit controlled substance under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
901(a) and 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(35)(ii).  Id.  Daniels 
acknowledges that the Pennsylvania Superior Court employed 
the substantial step standard (the well-established standard 
applicable under the Model Penal Code as well as both New 
Jersey and federal law) and found that the defendant had taken 
such a step.  He argues that, even under the interpretation most 
favorable to the government, Parker did nothing more than 
prepare the items for a later sale.  But the Parker court never 
suggested that it was applying some unique approach to the 
well-established “substantial step” requirement.  On the 
contrary, it explained that the actions that Parker undertook 
constituted a substantial step: 
 
He was carrying the cocaine-like substance 
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with him, packaged in plastic baggies “consistent 
with the way drug dealers handle or package 
crack cocaine,” and he admitted that he would sell 
it “if the opportunity presented itself.”  In 
Commonwealth v. Irby, 700 A.2d 463 (Pa. Super. 
1997), we found that a defendant who packaged 
candle wax in plastic baggies as cocaine and tried 
to sell it to an undercover officer, even though the 
sale never actually occurred, was sufficient to 
constitute delivery of a noncontrolled substance.  
Here, Parker took similar substantial steps toward 
the commission of the same crime, except that he 
was waiting for the opportunity of a possible 
buyer to present itself.  Therefore, the evidence 
was sufficient to convict Parker of attempted 
delivery of a noncontrolled substance. 
 
Id. at 318 (citation omitted).  The state court thereby mirrors the 
Model Penal Code itself, which identifies both “possession of 
materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, that 
are specially designed for such unlawful use or that can serve no 
lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances” and 
“possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be 
employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place 
contemplated for its commission, if such possession, collection 
or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the 
circumstances” as conduct that could be held to be a substantial 
step.  Model Penal Code § 501(2)(e), (f).  
 
Like Daniels, Martinez argued that “New Jersey law 
treats more forms of inchoate preparation for a crime as attempt 
than federal law does.”  Martinez, 906 F.3d at 281.  We rejected 
his argument, pointing out that the most recent explanation of 
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attempt by the New Jersey Supreme Court distinguishes 
between mere preparation and a substantial step and thereby 
tracks both the Model Penal Code and federal law.  Id. at 285 
(quoting State v. Farrad, 753 A.2d 648, 653 (N.J. 2000)).  “In 
dicta, Fornino stated:  ‘It is only ‘very remote preparatory acts’ 
which are excluded from the ambit of attempt liability.’”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Fornino, 539 A.2d 301, 306 (N.J. App. Div. 
1988)).  Despite this statement (which goes farther than the 
language in Parker), we explained that Fornino was a plain error 
case and the state court thereby did not have an occasion to 
define attempt liability.  Id.  The New Jersey Appellate Division 
“simply noted that ‘some preparation may amount to an attempt. 
 It is a question of degree.’”  Id. (quoting Fornino, 539 A.2d at 
306).  “So New Jersey courts wrestle with drawing that line, just 
as federal courts and the Model Penal Code do.”  Id.  The same 
is true with respect to the Pennsylvania courts.   
 
 Finally, Daniels insists that Pennsylvania criminalizes a 
buyer’s solicitation.  In other words, he argues that, while a drug 
purchaser cannot be held liable as an accomplice of the seller 
under federal law, he or she could be held liable under 
Pennsylvania law.  In support, Daniels relies on the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. 
Moss, 852 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), “which conferred 
liability under Section 7512 for a delivery, upon a buyer who 
had, only by virtue of being a buyer, facilitated the delivery.”  
(Appellant’s Reply Brief at 20.)  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
7512(a) provides that a person commits a felony of the third 
degree if that person “uses a communication facility to commit, 
cause or facilitate the commission or the attempt thereof of any 
crime which constitutes a felony under this title or under the act 
of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as the Controlled 
Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.”  In contrast, the 
Case: 17-3503     Document: 003113154934     Page: 36      Date Filed: 02/07/2019
  37 
United States Supreme Court rejected the theory that an 
analogous federal provision (prohibiting the use of a 
communication facility in committing, causing, or facilitating 
the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under the 
CSA) applies to someone “making a misdemeanor drug 
purchase because his phone call to the dealer can be said to 
facilitate the felony of drug distribution.”  Abuelhawa v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 816, 818 (2009) (addressing 21 U.S.C. § 
843(b)).  “To the contrary, Congress used no language spelling 
out a purpose so improbable, but legislated against a background 
usage of terms such as ‘aid,’ ‘abet,’ and ‘assist’ that points in the 
opposite direction and accords with the CSA’s choice to classify 
small purchases as misdemeanors.”  Id. at 824 (footnote 
omitted); see also, e.g., id. at 820 (“To begin with, the 
Government’s literal sweep of ‘facilitate’ sits uncomfortably 
with common usage.  Where a transaction like a sale necessarily 
presupposes two parties with specific roles, it would be odd to 
speak of one party as facilitating the conduct of the other.”). 
 
 We nevertheless believe that Daniels takes both Moss 
and Abuelhawa too far.  Daniels was not convicted under 
Section 7512.  As we have already explained in some detail, the 
federal and Pennsylvania principles governing accomplice as 
well as attempt liability are essentially identical (after all, they 
are both based on the Model Penal Code).  In turn, neither the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court nor the United States Supreme 
Court was making broad pronouncements about the scope of 
accomplice liability (or liability for attempt offenses).  Although 
it stated that the focus of its inquiry would be whether there was 
sufficient evidence that the defendants’ telephone calls 
facilitated the actual commission of an underlying felony, the 
Moss court addressed at some length whether the defendants 
took a substantial step toward delivery of a controlled substance 
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under the law of attempt.  Moss, 852 A.2d at 382-84.  It even 
determined that there was insufficient evidence to support some 
of the convictions.7  Id. at 383-84.  Rejecting the district court’s 
                                                 
7 According to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain Sullivan’s conviction because 
he placed a telephone call to Johnson inquiring about purchasing 
drugs, Johnson agreed to make the sale, and Johnson was seen 
briefly entering Sullivan’s home.  Moss, 852 A.2d at 383.  
“Appellant [Sullivan] made the necessary preparations and 
arranged a meeting point at which he and Johnson would 
complete the illicit transaction.”  Id.  “The record against Moss 
establishes, as to Counts 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8, Moss engaged in 
telephone conversations with a confidential informant and these 
telephone conversations facilitated controlled buy transactions 
between Moss and the informant.”  Id. at 384; see also, e.g., id. 
at 378 (“The only conclusion that can be reached from the 
stipulation is that the telephone was used to make the 
arrangements for the controlled buys that subsequently did occur 
between the confidential informant and the Defendant.”).  
However, the court found that Moss’s convictions on Counts 12 
and 13 cannot stand because of the absence of any evidence that 
Johnson actually attempted to make the delivery he discussed 
with Moss.  Id. at 384.  “The Commonwealth may not obtain a 
conviction under § 7512 based solely on evidence that the 
Appellant engaged in drug-related telephone conversations with 
a known drug trafficker.”  Id.  Likewise, “the record is devoid of 
any evidence that the contemplated transaction between Austin 
and Johnson actually occurred or that either Austin or Johnson 
took a substantial step toward completion of the transaction they 
discussed.”  Id. at 383-84.  “Viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, the evidence establishes merely that 
Austin engaged in drug-related telephone conversations with a 
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known drug trafficker.”  Id. at 384.   
 
According to Daniels, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
cites Moss as an example of the breadth of what constitutes a 
substantial step for attempted delivery in Pennsylvania.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rivers, No. 1004 EDA 2013, 2014 WL 
10936727, at *2-*5, *16-*17 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 30, 2014) 
(non-precedential decision).  In Rivers, the evidence clearly 
established that the defendant went beyond mere preparation 
(e.g., the defendant on his own initiative gave his telephone 
number to the undercover officer so that she could contact him 
to purchase illicit substances, they engaged in a telephone 
discussion to arrange a transaction, setting the price as well as 
the time and location, the defendant was proceeding toward and 
was near the site for the transaction when he was arrested, and 
he had a bag containing counterfeit cocaine).  See, e.g., id. at 
*17.  Daniels also claims that “it now appears that a person who 
solicits another to provide drugs – as by offering to pay a dealer 
– may be subject to conviction of delivery in violation of 
subsection (a)(30) as an accomplice.”  (Daniels’s October 1, 
2018 Letter at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 
1228, 1234 (Pa. 2004)).)  “In federal law, by contrast, 
solicitation will not support a drug trafficking conviction under 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846.  See United States v. Rivera-
Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2001).”  (Id.)  The 
Murphy court determined that the jury could have found that the 
defendant intended to aid in the transfer of drugs by the seller to 
the undercover officer “based on the evidence that Murphy 
called out to Rivas after the trooper approached him, confirmed 
to Rivas that the trooper was not a police officer, stayed with the 
trooper while Rivas got drugs, and requested compensation from 
the trooper for his efforts.”  Murphy, 844 A.2d at 1237.  The 
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suggestion that Abuelhawa altered the pleading requirements for 
offenses invoking accomplice liability, we have explained that 
“[t]he Abuelhawa Court simply addressed a narrow question 
regarding the scope of the term ‘facilitate’ under § 843(b).”  
United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 599 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
Abuelhawa, 556 U.S. at 818); see also, e.g., id. (“Nor did the 
decision modify the law of accomplice liability under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2.  The elements of aiding and abetting under § 2 remain the 
same.”).  Like Huet, “[w]e decline to extend its holding any 
further.”8  Id.      
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the mandatory 
minimum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment entered by the 
District Court.               
 
                                                                                                             
state supreme court further found that the evidence showed that 
Murphy actually aided Rivas in transferring the drugs to the 
trooper by screening the trooper for the seller.  Id.  Finally, we 
expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of federal 
attempt law in Martinez.  906 F.3d at 286-87.  
 
8 Accordingly, we need not (and do not) consider 
whether, even if Pennsylvania’s solicitation law sweeps more 
broadly than its federal counterpart, “[s]uch criminal conduct is 
not so remote or tangential to its aim, that is, the actual or 
constructive transfer of a controlled substance, to justify 
disqualification as a ‘serious drug offense’ under ACCA” 
(Appellee’s Brief at 29).   
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